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1 Introduction
Several studies in the psychological literature demonstrate that peoples learning be-
havior is prone to e¤ects such as myside bias or irrational belief persistence (cf.,
e.g., Baron 2007, Chapter 9). For instance, in a famous experiment by Lord, Ross, and
Lepper (1979), subjects supporting and opposing capital punishment were exposed to
two purported studies, one conrming and one disconrming their existing beliefs about
the deterrent e¢ cacy of the death penalty. Despite the fact that both groups received
the same information, their learning behavior resulted in an increased attitude polar-
ization in the sense that their respective posterior beliefs, either in favor or against
the deterrent e¢ cacy of death penalty, further diverged. Analogous results on diverging
posterior beliefs in the face of identical information have earlier been reported by Pitz,
Downing, and Reinhold (1967) and Pitz (1969) in the context of Bayesian updating of
subjective probabilities. In violation of Bayes update rule the subjects in these ex-
periments formed biased posteriors that supported their original opinions rather than
taking into account the evidence. The learning behavior elicited in these experiments
cannot be explained by the standard model of rational Bayesian learning according to
which di¤erences in agentsprior beliefs must decrease rather than increase whenever
the agents receive identical information. Models of rational Bayesian learning thus ap-
parently ignore relevant aspects of real-life peoples learning behavior.
In this paper we present formal models of Bayesian learning that allow for the pos-
sibility of a myside bias. As our point of departure we assume that the paradigm of
rational Bayesian learning may only be violated by agents who have ambiguous beliefs.
That is, the beliefs of such agents cannot be described by additive probability measures
alone but they additionally reect the agents personal attitudes. The impact of new
information on an agents beliefs is then two-fold. On the one hand, we take into ac-
count rationalupdating based on objective empirical evidence in accordance with the
standard rational Bayesian learning hypothesis (cf., Tonks 1983; Viscusi and OConnor
1984; Viscusi 1985). On the other hand, however, we also assume existence of a myside
biaswhich results in an irrationalenforcement of the agentspersonal attitudes.
Our formal model is developed in two steps. In a rst step we model ambiguous beliefs
as non-additive probability measures, i.e., capacities, which arise in Choquet Expected
Utility (CEU) theory (Schmeidler 1989; Gilboa 1987).1 More specically, we consider
neo-additive capacities in the sense of Chateauneuf, Eichberger and Grant (2006) such
that an agents non-additive belief about the likelihood of an event is a weighted average
1CEU theory was originally developed to describe ambiguity attitudes that may explain Ellsberg
paradoxes (Ellsberg 1961).
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of an ambiguous part and an additive part. According to our interpretation, the additive
part of the agents belief is her best estimator for the trueprobability of a given event.
The ambiguous part of her belief is relevant whenever the agent lacks absolute condence
in this estimator. This lack of condence is resolved in our model by a parameter that
measures the agents optimistic versus pessimistic personal attitudes with respect to
ambiguity.
In a second step we model the updating of ambiguous beliefs. According to our
understanding of Bayesian learning, an agent with absolute condence in her additive
estimator should behave as a rational Bayesian learner. As a consequence, we assume
that the additive part of the agents posterior beliefs is governed by the standard rational
Bayesian learning model of Viscusi (1985). In case there exists some ambiguity, we con-
sider specic Bayesian update rules expressing di¤erent psychological attitudes towards
the interpretation of new information (Gilboa and Schmeidler 1993). In particular, we
analyze the consequences of the so-called full Bayesian (Pires 2002; Eichberger, Grant,
and Kelsey 2006; Sinischalchi 2001, 2006) as well as the optimistic and the pessimistic
update rules (Gilboa and Schmeidler 1993). An application of these update rules to
some prior belief where the agent expresses ambiguity results in a Bayesian learning
process that di¤ers from rational Bayesian learning in that convergence to the true
probabilities of some objective random process will - in general - not emerge. Rather,
updating of beliefs reenforces optimistic, respectively pessimistic, attitudes of the agent
thereby giving rise to learning behavior with a myside bias.
Using this framework we then analyze the beliefs of two heterogeneous agents who
have some prior beliefs, receive identical information and then update their beliefs ac-
cording to some Bayesian update rule with psychological bias. Thereby, we di¤erentiate
between a weak and a strong form of myside bias. The weak form of myside bias is
characterized by diverging posterior beliefs of the agents under repeated learning with
identical information whereby the beliefs may move into the same direction. According
to our interpretation the strong form of myside bias is equivalent to attitude polariza-
tion in that the posterior beliefs of the two agents move into opposite directions under
repeated learning with identical information. To derive our main results we then con-
sider two scenarios: In our rst scenario the two agents have di¤erent initial beliefs and
update their beliefs based on the same information by applying the same update rule.
In our second scenario, the two agents receive the same information but apply di¤erent
update rules. In both scenarios the resulting posterior beliefs may exhibit the weak as
well as the strong form of myside bias. Notice that, in order to derive our result in the
second scenario, we do not require that the agents have identical initial priors.
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The remainder of our analysis is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the standard
model of rational Bayesian learning of non-ambiguous beliefs and section 3 introduces
ambiguous beliefs. Section 4 discusses updating of ambiguous beliefs under the three
di¤erent update rules  full Bayesian, optimistic and pessimistic updating  that we
consider in this paper. Section 5 then presents our main results on weak and strong
myside bias in the form of diverging beliefs and attitude polarization. Finally, section 6
concludes.
2 Rational Bayesian learning
Consider the situation of an agent who is uncertain about the probability of an event, E,
but can observe a statistical experiment with n independent trials where E is a possible
outcome in each trial. Let
S = 1i=0 fE;:Eg
denote the experiments sample space, whereby :E is the complement of E, and dene
Sn = ni=0 fE;:Eg ,
S n = 1i=n+1 fE;:Eg .
We can then formally describe the agents information structure by the partitions
P (n) = ffyg  S n j y 2 Sng
where n = 0; 1; :::;1 denotes the n-th trial of the experiment. Denote by y the vector of
outcomes observed by the agent. Since fygS n 2 P (n), after the n-th trial the agent
knows the outcomes of the rst n trials but not the outcomes of the remaining trials. For
example, while the agent is totally ignorant with respect to the experiments outcome
before the rst trial, i.e., P (0) = fSg, she has perfect information after innitely many
trials, i.e., P (1) = ffyg j y 2 Sg.
Suppose that the agent has a prior Beta probability distribution over the  parameter
of a Binomial-distribution where  (E) is the trueprobability of outcome E.2 Further
suppose that the agent resolves her uncertainty about  by an estimator ~ (E) that is
the expected value of this Beta-distribution, i.e., ~ (E) = 
+
for given distribution
parameters ;  > 0. More specically, the prior Beta distribution has probability
density
f () =
(
K;
 1 (1  ) 1 for 0    1
0 else
2This Beta distribution model of rational Bayesian learning was introduced in the economic literature
by Viscusi and OConnor (1984) and Viscusi (1985).
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where K; is a normalizing constant.3 Let In  S denote the event that E has occurred
k-times in n trials. Obviously, the information In is known to the agent after n trials since
we have for the true outcome fygS n  In. Further, denote by f ( j In) the posterior
probability density conditional on this sample information. Since the probability of
receiving information In for a given  is, by the Binomial-assumption,
f (In j ) =

n
k

k (1  )n k ,
we obtain by Bayesrule
f ( j In) = f (In j ) f ()
~ (In)
= K+k;+n k+k 1 (1  )+n k 1
whenever ~ (In) =
Z
f (In j ) f () d > 0.
Observe that the agents subjective posterior distribution over  is a Beta-distribution
with expected parameters  + k;  + n   k. Accordingly, the agents posterior belief is
given by the expected value of the posterior distribution, +k
++n
, which, using that the
prior belief is ~ (E) = 
+
and denoting the sample mean by n =
k
n
, we can rewrite as
~ (E j In) =

+ 
+  + n

~ (E) +

n
+  + n

n: (1)
That is, the agents posterior is a weighted average of her prior and the sample mean
whereby the weight attached to the sample mean increases in the number of trials.4
Since, for every c > 0, limn!1 prob (jn    (E)j  c) = 1 we obtain the following result
for this standard model of rational Bayesian learning.
Proposition 1: Under the assumption of ~ (In) > 0 for all n the posterior belief
~ (E j In) converges in probability to the true probability of event E if the number
of trials, n, approaches innity.
As a consequence, the standard model of rational Bayesian learning cannot account
for the learning behavior of agents whose posterior beliefs systematically diverge while
they receive the same information.
3In particular, K; =
 (+)
 () () where   (y) =
1Z
0
xy 1e xdx for y > 0.
4Tonks (1983) introduces a similar model of rational Bayesian learning in which the agent has a
normally distributed prior over the mean of some normal distribution and receives normally distributed
information.
5
3 Ambiguous beliefs
We assume that individuals exhibit ambiguity attitudes in the sense of Schmeidler (1989)
and who may thus, for example, commit paradoxes of the Ellsberg type (Ellsberg 1961).
Following Schmeidler (1989) and Gilboa (1987), we describe such individuals as Choquet
Expected Utility (CEU) decision makers, that is, they maximize expected utility with
respect to non-additive beliefs. Properties of non-additive beliefs are used in the litera-
ture for formal denitions of, e.g., ambiguity and uncertainty attitudes (Schmeidler 1989;
Epstein 1999; Ghirardato and Marinacchi 2002), pessimism and optimism (Eichberger
and Kelsey 1999; Wakker 2001; Chateauneuf, Eichberger, and Grant 2006), as well as
sensitivity to changes in likelihood (Wakker 2004). Our own approach focuses on non-
additive beliefs that are dened as neo-additive capacities in the sense of Chateauneuf,
Eichberger and Grant (2006).
Denition. For a given measurable space (
;F) the neo-additive capacity, , is de-
ned, for some ;  2 [0; 1] by
 (E) =   (  !o (E) + (1  )  !p (E)) + (1  )  ~ (E) (2)
for all E 2 F such that ~ is some additive probability measure and we have for
the non-additive capacities !o
!o (E) = 1 if E 6= ;
!o (E) = 0 if E = ;
and !p respectively
!p (E) = 0 if E 6= 

!p (E) = 1 if E = 
.
Recall that a Savage-act f is a mapping from the state space 
 into the set of
consequences X. For a nite state space the Choquet expected utility of Savage act f
with respect to a neo-additive capacity  is given as
CEU (f; ) = 

 max
s2

u (f (s)) + (1  ) min
s2

u (f (s))

+(1  )
X
s2

~ (s)u (f (s)) ,
(3)
where u : X ! R is a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function. Neo-additive capac-
ities can be interpreted as non-additive beliefs that stand for deviations from additive
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beliefs such that a parameter  (degree of ambiguity) measures the lack of condence the
decision maker has in some subjective additive probability distribution ~. Obviously, if
there is no ambiguity, i.e.,  = 0, (3) reduces to the standard subjective expected utility
representation of Savage (1954). In case there is some ambiguity, however, the second
parameter  measures how much weight the decision maker puts on the best possible
outcome of alternative f when resolving her ambiguity. Conversely, (1  ) is the weight
she puts on the worst possible outcome of f . As a consequence, we interpret  as an
optimism under ambiguity parameter whereby  = 1, resp.  = 0, corresponds to
extreme optimism, resp. extreme pessimism, with respect to resolving ambiguity in the
decision makers belief.
Finally, observe that for non-degenerate events, i.e., E =2 f;;
g, the neo-additive
capacity  in (2), simplies to
 (E) =   + (1  )  ~ (E) : (4)
4 Updating ambiguous beliefs
In contrast to EU preferences, CEU preferences give rise to several possibilities for
deriving ex post preferences, i.e., preferences conditional on the fact that some event
has occurred, from ex ante preferences. In this section we focus attention on three
perceivable Bayesian update rules for non-additive probability measures and apply them
to neo-additive capacities. As such we discuss the so-called full (or generalized) Bayesian
update rule (Eichberger, Grant, and Kelsey 2006), as well as the optimistic and the
pessimistic update rules (Gilboa and Schmeidler 1993).
Dene the Savage-act fIh : 
! X such that
fIh (s) =
(
f (s) for s 2 I
h (s) for s 2 :I
where I is some event. Recall that Savages sure-thing principle claims that, for all acts
f; g; h; h0 and all events I,
fIh  gIh implies fIh0  gIh0.
Let us interpret event I as new information received by the agent. The sure-thing
principle then implies a straightforward way for deriving preferences I , conditional on
the new information I, from the agents original preferences  over Savage-acts. Namely,
we have
f I g if and only if fIh  gIh for any h, (5)
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implying for a subjective expected utility maximizer
f I g if and only if EU (f;  ( j I))  EU (g;  ( j I))
whereby  ( j I) is the additive conditional probability measure derived from the Bayesian
update rule, i.e., for all E 2 F ,
 (E j I) =  (E \ I)
 (I)
.
In order to accommodate ambiguity attitudes as elicited in Ellsberg paradoxes, CEU
theory drops the sure-thing principle. As a consequence, conditional CEU preferences
are no longer derivable from (5) since the specication of the act h is now relevant (see
Gilboa and Schmeidler 1993; Pires 2002; Eichberger, Grant and Kelsey 2006; Sinischalchi
2001, 2006 for a discussion of di¤erent Bayesian update rules).
Let us at rst consider conditional CEU preferences satisfying, for all acts f; g,
f I g if and only if fIh  gIh
where h is the so-called conditional certainty equivalent of g, i.e., h is the constant act
such that g I h. The corresponding Bayesian update rule for the non-additive beliefs
of a CEU decision maker is the so-called full Bayesian update rule which is given as
follows (Eichberger, Grant, and Kelsey 2006)
FB (E j I) =  (E \ I)
 (E \ I) + 1   (E [ :I) (6)
where FB (E j I) denotes the conditional capacity for event E 2 F given information
I 2 F .
Observation 2: Let E; I =2 f;;
g and E \ I 6= ?. Then an application of the full
Bayesian update rule (6) to a prior belief (4) results in the posterior belief
FB (E j I) = FBI  +
 
1  FBI
  ~ (E j I) (7)
such that
FBI =

 + (1  )  ~ (I) . (8)
Proof: If E; I =2 f;;
g and E \ I 6= ?, then
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FB (E j I) =   + (1  )  ~ (E \ I)
  + (1  )  ~ (E \ I) + 1  (  + (1  )  ~ (E [ :I))
=
  + (1  )  ~ (E \ I)
1 + (1  )  (~ (E \ I)  ~ (E [ :I))
=
  + (1  )  ~ (E \ I)
1 + (1  )  (~ (E \ I)  ~ (E)  ~ (:I) + ~ (E \ :I))
=
  + (1  )  ~ (E \ I)
1 + (1  )  ( ~ (:I))
=
  + (1  )  ~ (E \ I)
 + (1  )  ~ (I)
=
  
 + (1  )  ~ (I) +
(1  )  ~ (I)
 + (1  )  ~ (I) ~ (E j I)
= FBI  +
 
1  FBI
  ~ (E j I)
with FBI given by (8).
In addition to the full Bayesian update rule we also consider so-called h-Bayesian
update rules for preferences  over Savage acts as introduced by Gilboa and Schmeidler
(1993). That is, we consider some collection of conditional preference orderings,
hI	
for all events I, such that for all acts f; g
f hI g if and only if fIh  gIh (9)
where
h = (x; A;x;:A) ; (10)
with x denoting the best and x denoting the worst consequence possible and A 2 F .
For the so-called optimistic update rule h is the constant act where A = ;. That is,
under the optimistic update rule the null-event, :I, becomes associated with the worst
consequence possible. Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993) o¤er the following psychological
motivation for this update rule:
[...] when comparing two actions given a certain event I, the decision maker implicitly
assumes that had I not occurred, the worst possible outcome [...] would have
resulted. In other words, the behavior given I [...] exhibits happinessthat I has
occurred; the decisions are made as if we are always in the best of all possible
worlds.
As corresponding optimistic Bayesian update rule for conditional beliefs of CEU
decision makers we obtain
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opt (E j I) =  (E \ I)
 (I)
: (11)
Observation 3: Suppose E; I =2 f?;
g. An application of the optimistic update rule
(11) to a prior belief (4) results in the conditional belief
opt (E j I) = optI +
 
1  optI
  ~ (E j I)
with
optI =
  
  + (1  )  ~ (I) .
Proof: Applying the optimistic Bayesian update rule to a neo-additive capacity
gives, for E =2 f?;
g,
opt (E j I) =   + (1  )  ~ (E \ I)
  + (1  )  ~ (I)
=
  
  + (1  )  ~ (I) +
(1  )  ~ (I)
  + (1  )  ~ (I)  ~ (E j I)
= optI +
 
1  optI
  ~ (E j I)
such that
optI =
  
  + (1  )  ~ (I) .

For the pessimistic (or Dempster-Shafer) update rule h is the constant act where
A = 
, associating with the null-event,:I, the best consequence possible. Gilboa and
Schmeidler (1993):
[...] we consider a pessimisticdecision maker, whose choices reveal the hidden as-
sumption that all the impossible worlds are the best conceivable ones.
The corresponding pessimistic Bayesian update rule for CEU decision makers is
pess (E j I) =  (E [ :I)   (:I)
1   (:I) : (12)
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Observation 4: Suppose E; I =2 f?;
g. An application of the pessimistic update rule
(12) to a prior belief (4) results in the conditional belief
pess (E j I) = (1  pessI )  ~ (E j I)
with
pessI =
  (1  )
  (1  ) + (1  )  ~ (I) .
Proof: Applying the pessimistic Bayesian update rule to a neo-additive capacity
gives, for E =2 f?;
g,
pess (E j I) =  (E [ :I)   (:I)
1   (:I)
=
  + (1  )  ~ (E [ :I)      (1  )  ~ (:I)
1      (1  )  ~ (:I)
=
(1  )  ~ (E)
1      (1  )  (~ (:I))  
(1  ) ~ (E \ :I)
1      (1  )  (~ (:I))
=
(1  )  ~ (E)
1      (1  )  (~ (:I))  
(1  ) ~ (:I)
1      (1  )  (~ (:I)) ~ (E j :I)
=
(1  )  ~ (E)
1      (1  )  (~ (:I))
  (1  ) ~ (:I)
1      (1  )  (~ (:I))

~ (E)  ~ (E j I)  ~ (I)
~ (:I)

=
(1  )  ~ (I)
  (1  ) + (1  )  ~ (I)  ~ (E j I)
= (1  pessI )  ~ (E j I)
such that
pessI =
  (1  )
  (1  ) + (1  )  ~ (I) .

5 Diverging posteriors and attitude polarization
In this section we derive our main results which formally link the updating of ambiguous
beliefs to diverging posteriors and attitude polarization in Bayesian learning behavior.
Consider two agents i 2 f1; 2g and let
i (E) = ii + (1  i)  ~i (E)
11
denote the belief of agent i. If a posterior belief i (E j In), i 2 f1; 2g, converges in
probability to a unique limit, we simply write this limiting posterior belief as i (E j I1).
That is, i (E j I1) satises for every c > 0
lim
n!1
prob (ji (E j In)  i (E j I1)j  c) = 1.
We assume that both agents receive the same information, i.e., P1 (n) = P2 (n) =
P (n) for all n. Our formal denition of attitude polarizationcaptures the idea that
the agentsposteriors diverge rather than converge when their initial beliefs are di¤erent
despite the fact that they receive the same information. Moreover, we allow for the
possibility that the agents can observe arbitrarily many trials and consider posterior
beliefs that obtain in the limit.
Our rst assumption ensures that the standard model of Bayesian learning discussed
in section 2 obtains as a special case whenever the beliefs are non-ambiguous, i.e.,  = 0.
Assumption 1: If agent i 2 f1; 2g updates a neo-additive priors i (E) conditional
on information In, then the additive part of her posterior belief, i.e., ~i (E j In),
conforms with rational Bayesian learning (1) whereby ~i (In) > 0 for all n.
By the following assumption, we restrict attention to the case in which di¤erences
in initial beliefs of agents can only be due to their respective optimism parameters i,
i 2 f1; 2g, under ambiguity.
Assumption 2: Both agents have identical additive estimators, i.e., ~1 (E) = ~2 (E) =
~ (E) for all E 2 F , as well as identical degrees of ambiguity, i.e., 1 = 2 = .
Since the information partitions P (n) become ner with increasing n, the corre-
sponding sample information forms a nested sequence of events I0  I1  :::  I1. The
sequence of subjective probabilities ~ (I0) ; ~ (I1) ; ::: is therefore monotonically decreas-
ing, implying the existence of a unique limit point
lim
n!1
~ (In) = ~ (I1) 2 [0; 1] .
Together with the above assumptions and proposition 1 this fact allows us to characterize
the convergence behavior with respect to the di¤erent update rules discussed in section
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4. By proposition 1, we have for the additive part of the beliefs convergence to the true
probability of event E, i.e.,
lim
n!1
prob (j~ (E j In)   (E)j  c) = 1
for every c > 0, so that we nd for i 2 f1; 2g:
Lemma
(i) Full Bayesian learning. For E; I =2 f;;
g and E \ I 6= ?,
FBi (E j I1) = FBI1  i +
 
1  FBI1
   (E)
with
FBI1 =

 + (1  )  ~ (I1)
(ii) Optimistic Bayesian learning. For E; I =2 f;;
g,
opti (E j I1) = optI1 +
 
1  optI1
   (E)
with
optI1 =
  i
  i + (1  )  ~ (I1)
(iii) Pessimistic Bayesian learning. For E; I =2 f;;
g,
pessi (E j I1) =
 
1  pessI1
   (E)
with
pessI1 =
  (1  i)
  (1  i) + (1  )  ~ (I1)
We are now ready to state and prove our main results. To focus our analysis we only
consider interesting di¤erences between the two heterogeneous agents. In particular, we
di¤erentiate between two relevant cases of heterogeneity. On the one hand, we consider
full Bayesian learners who have di¤erent initial attitudes with respect to optimism under
ambiguity implying di¤erent prior beliefs. On the other hand, we consider agents who
may have identical prior beliefs but have di¤erent, i.e., optimistic resp. pessimistic,
attitudes with respect to the interpretation of new information. As our rst main result
(proposition 2) we identify conditions under which posterior beliefs diverge such that the
directed distance between the posterior beliefs of the two agents is strictly greater than
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the directed distance between their priors. That is, we consider diverging posteriors in
the sense that
1 (E j I1)  2 (E j I1) > 1 (E)  2 (E) (13)
where 1 (E)  2 (E). For example, if there is an initial gap in the prior beliefs, the
repeated learning of identical information will widen this gap whereby the posteriors
may move in the same direction. We also refer to this divergence in beliefs as a weak
form of myside bias.
Proposition 2. (Diverging Posteriors)
(i) Assume that both agents are full Bayesian learners. Then inequality (13) is
satised if and only if  2 (0; 1), 1 > 2, and ~ (I1) < 1.
(ii) Assume that agent 1 is an optimistic whereas agent 2 is a pessimistic Bayesian
learner. Then inequality (13) is satised if  2 (0; 1), 1  2, and ~ (I1) <
1  1  2.
Proof:
Part (i). Let 1 > 2 and observe that, by the lemma, (13), i.e.,
I1  1 + (1  I1)   (E)  (I1  2 + (1  I1)   (E))
>   1 + (1  )  ~ (E)  (  2 + (1  )  ~ (E)) ,
is equivalent to I1 > , i.e.,

 + (1  )  ~ (I1) > ,
which holds if and only if  2 (0; 1) and ~ (I1) < 1. Finally, observe that 1  2
violates (13).
Part (ii). By the lemma, (13) now becomes
optI1 +
 
1  optI1
   (E)   1  pessI1    (E)
> 1 + (1  )  ~ (E)  (2 + (1  )  ~ (E)) ,
which is equivalent to
optI1 +
 
pessI1   optI1
   (E) >  (1   2) .
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This last inequality is obviously satised for all  (E) and  2 (0; 1) if optI1 > , i.e.,
  1
  1 + (1  )  ~ (I1) >  ,
1 > ~ (I1) ,
and pessI1  optI1, i.e.,
  (1  2)
  (1  2) + (1  )  ~ (I1) 
  1
  1 + (1  )  ~ (I1) ,
1  2  1.
Finally, observe that 1 < 2 violates the assumption 1 (E)  2 (E).
Our second main result (proposition 3) focuses on conditions that ensure attitude
polarization. Attitude polarization in our sense is a stronger concept than mere diver-
gence of posteriors in that it additionally requires that the posteriors move in opposite
directions. More specically, we consider attitude polarization such that
1 (E j I1) > 1 (E)  2 (E) > 2 (E j I1) . (14)
In order to further focus our analysis we thereby restrict attention to the case in which
the subjective estimator coincides with the objective probability, i.e., ~ (E) =  (E).
Proposition 3. (Attitude Polarization)
(i) Assume that both agents are full Bayesian learners and let ~ (E) =  (E) 2
(0; 1). Then inequality (14) is satised if and only if  2 (0; 1), 1 > 2,
~ (I1) < 1, and
1 >  (E) > 2. (15)
(ii) Assume that agent 1 is an optimistic whereas agent 2 is a pessimistic Bayesian
learner and let ~ (E) =  (E) 2 (0; 1). Then inequality (14) is satised if
 2 (0; 1), 1  2, and
~ (I1) < min f1; 1  2g . (16)
Proof:
Part (i). For full Bayesian learners (14) becomes
I1  1 + (1  I1)   (E) >   1 + (1  )  ~ (E)
   2 + (1  )  ~ (E) > I1  2 + (1  I1)   (E) ,
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which obviously implies 1 > 2 and thereby the middle inequality is strict. Under
the assumption ~ (E) =  (E), the rst and the last inequality then hold if and only if
I1 > , i.e.,  2 (0; 1) and ~ (I1) < 1, compare proposition 2, part (i), as well as
1 >  (E) > 2,
which proves the result.
Part (ii). Consider at rst agent 1. Observe that
1 (E j I1) > 1 (E),
optI1 +
 
1  optI1
   (E) >  + (1  )  ~ (E)
which, under the assumption that ~ (E) =  (E), is equivalent to optI1 > , i.e.,
  1
  1 + (1  )  ~ (I1) > .
This proves that  2 (0; 1) and ~ (I1) < 1 are necessary and su¢ cient conditions for
1 (E j I1) > 1 (E).
Consider now agent 2 and observe that
2 (E) > 2 (E j I1),
 + (1  )  ~ (E) >  1  pessI1    (E),
 + (1  )  ~ (E) >

(1  )  ~ (I1)
  (1  2) + (1  )  ~ (I1)

  (E)
which, under the assumption that ~ (E) =  (E), necessarily holds for any  > 0 if
~ (I1)
  (1  2) + (1  )  ~ (I1) < 1,
2 < 1  ~ (I1) .
This proves the result.
Remark. While our results of propositions 2(i) and 3(i) are driven by the initial gap
in prior beliefs, the results of propositions 2(ii) and 3(ii) build upon the di¤erent learning
rules of the agents. According to condition (15) attitude polarization for full Bayesian
learners rather occurs if the di¤erence in initial beliefs is large, i.e., strong optimism of
agent 1 versus strong pessimism of agent 2. Observe that, under the assumptions of
proposition 3(ii), condition (16) ensures attitude polarization for an arbitrary ambiguity
parameter  2 (0; 1) and arbitrary probability  (E) 2 (0; 1). In contrast to the nding
for full Bayesian learners, we may therefore encounter attitude polarization for optimistic
and pessimistic Bayesian learners even in the case of identical prior beliefs if ~ (I1) is
su¢ ciently small.
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6 Conclusion
To account for phenomena such as myside bias or irrational belief persistence in
peoples learning behavior we propose formal models in which the interpretation of
new information is prone to psychological bias. Based on a simplied representation of
ambiguous beliefs we develop parsimonious representations of the agents initial beliefs
and updating processes. Thereby, we focus attention on three alternative update rules
that are characterized by di¤erent degrees of optimism, respectively pessimism, in the
interpretation of new information. As a specic feature to our approach, the resulting
models of Bayesian learning with psychological attitudes reduce to the standard model of
rational Bayesian learning in the absence of ambiguity. However, we show that a model
with rational Bayesian learning alone results in convergent beliefs and is therefore not a
suitable framework to account for phenomena such as a myside bias.
We then develop a two heterogeneous agents setting to derive divergent posterior
beliefs and attitude polarization for the agents learning processes under ambiguity.
Attitude polarization is dened as a stronger condition than divergent beliefs in that the
posterior beliefs of the two agents move into opposite directions. While we assume that
the agents receive the same information, the agents may have di¤erent prior beliefs or
apply di¤erent learning rules. Two main ndings emerge:
1. We may observe divergent posterior beliefs and attitude polarization for agents
who have identical attitudes with respect to the interpretation of new information
but have di¤erent initial attitudes with respect to optimism, resp. pessimism,
under ambiguity;
2. We may observe divergent posterior beliefs and attitude polarization in case the
agents have identical initial attitudes with respect to optimism, resp. pessimism,
under ambiguity but have di¤erent attitudes with respect to the interpretation of
new information.
Our stylized Bayesian learning models thus formally accommodate two alternative
scenarios of a myside bias. In a rst scenario, a myside biasin the learning process
arises because of personal attitudes towards the resolution of ambiguity. In a second
scenario, a myside biascorresponds to personal attitudes towards the interpretation
of information.
In future research we aim to apply our approach to topics in information economics
that are typically analyzed under the assumption of rational Bayesian learning such as
ctitious play in strategic games (see, e.g., Fudenberg and Kreps 1993; Fudenberg and
Levine 1995; Krishna and Sjostrom 1998) or no-trade results (see, e.g., Milgrom and
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Stokey 1982; Morris 1994; Neeman 1996; Zimper 2007). Along the line of heterogeneous
agent models that depart from the rational expectations or rational Bayesian learning
paradigms, our approach may also have promising implications for asset pricing models
(see, e.g., Cecchetti, Lam, and Mark 2000; Abel 2002; Ludwig and Zimper 2006) and
theories of the wealth distribution (see, e.g., Ameriks, Caplin, and Leahy 2003).
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